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Abstract
In this paper, a novel method for independent access of diﬀerent layers of protected scalable video coding (SVC), based
on framework of state of the art H.264/AVC, is presented. For a SVC bitstream, a user accessing the base layer needS
only one key while users accessing the enhancement layer need keys for both the base layer and enhancement layer.
Hence if a user is accessing the highest available layer, keys of all the lower layers are also needed to decode it properly.
We have devised a scheme in which the user accessing any particular resolution use only one key whether it is the base
layer or any of the enhancement layers, and all the keys have the same length. Advanced encryption standard (AES)
algorithm in Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode has been used in this scheme to make the keys secure. The scheme has
been tested both for oﬄine playback and online streaming environment. Five diﬀerent benchmark video sequences
having three resolutions and containing diﬀerent combinations of motion, texture and objects are used for experimental
evaluation of the proposed algorithm.
c© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
With the evolution of Internet to a heterogeneous network both in terms of processing power and network
bandwidth, diﬀerent users demand the diﬀerent versions of the same content. This has given birth to the
scalable era of multimedia where a single bitstream contains multiple versions of the multimedia content
which can be diﬀerent in terms of resolution, frame rate or quality. As diﬀerent customers purchase rights for
diﬀerent versions of the same content, the concern about the protection and authentication of SVC bitstreams
have surfaced. Encryption can be used to restrict access to only authenticated users for the respective version
of the multimedia content. Since video data is huge in amount and multimedia applications have real time
constraints, full encryption of multimedia content is avoided. The concept of selective encryption (SE) has
been evolved in which only a small part of the whole bitstream is encrypted [1].
Encryption of H.264/AVC has been studied in [2, 3] and encryption of arithmetic coding has been dis-
cussed in [4, 5]. But the problem with these techniques is that they make the bitstream non-compliant to
the standard.
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H.264/AVC supports two types of entropy codings; namely context adaptive variable length coding
(CAVLC) and context adaptive binary arithmetic coding (CABAC). Algorithms have been developed to
perform SE of both of these modules which fulﬁlls real-time constraints by keeping the bitrate unchanged,
generating completely compliant bitstream and utilizing negligible processing power [6, 7]. In this work, we
are extending these algorithms to SE of SVC in such a way that independent protection of every resolution
is performed. In Section 2, overview of SVC and SE of H.264/AVC is presented. We explain the proposed
algorithm in Section 3. Section 4 contains its experimental results and performance evaluation, followed by
the concluding remarks in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Scalable video coding
SVC is based on H.264/AVC and uses pyramid architecture. In SVC, the video bitstream contains a base
layer and number of enhancement layers. Enhancement layers are added to the base layer to further improve
the coded video. The improvement can be made by increasing the spatial resolution, video frame-rate or
video quality, corresponding to spatial, temporal and quality/SNR scalability. Previous video standards
such as MPEG-2 [8], MPEG-4 [9] and H.263+ [10] also contain the scalable proﬁles but they were not
much appreciated because the quality and scalability came at the cost of coding eﬃciency. SVC based
on H.264/AVC has achieved signiﬁcant improvements both in terms of coding eﬃciency and scalability as
compared to scalable extensions of prior video coding standards. Similar to the previous scalable video
coding standards, SVC is also built upon a predictive and layered approach to scalable video coding.
In spatial scalability, the inter-layer prediction of the enhancement-layer is utilized to remove redundancy
across video layers as shown in Fig. 1.a. The resolution of the enhancement layer is either equal or greater
than the lower layer. Enhancement layer P images can be predicted either from lower layer or from the
previous frame in the same layer. In temporal scalability, the frame rate of enhancement layer is better
as compared to the lower layer. This is implemented using I, P and B frame types. In Fig. 1.b, I and P
frames constitute the base layer. B frames are predicted from I and P frames and constitute the second layer.
In quality/SNR scalability, the temporal and spatial resolution of the video remain the same and only the
quality of the coded video is enhanced.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Examples of scalability oﬀered by SVC: (a) spatial scalability, (b) temporal scalability.
2.2. SE based on CAVLC and CABAC
Here, we are giving an overview of the SE based on CAVLC and CABAC which has already been
presented in [6, 7]. Our SE techniques fulﬁll the real-time constraints by keeping the format compliance,
the bitrate unchanged and utilizing negligible processing power. To keep the bitstream format compliant,
we cannot encrypt MB header. Syntax elements which belong to MB header are usually used for prediction
and their encryption makes the bitstream undecodable.
In SE of CAVLC, the encryptable syntax elements are the signs of T1’s, levels and their signs. CAVLC
use multiple tables to adapt the local statistics of DCT coeﬃcients. To keep the bitrate unchanged, VLC
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codewords, having same length, constitute the encryption space (ES). This ES equals to 2n where n is the
number of the VLC table being used.
In SE of CABAC, we encrypt the bin strings before the binary arithmetic coding (BAC) module for the sake
of format compliance. The encryptable syntax elements are su f f ix of NZs with |NZ| > 14 and signs of all
the NZs. The encryption space is log2(n + 1) where n is the suﬃx part of absolute value of NZ.
3. The Proposed Algorithm
In scalable encryption, interlayer prediction option is very important and can be o f f , on or adaptive. If
it is o f f and we use the same pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) to encode all the layers in scalable
encoding, even a single layer from the bitstream cannot be decrypted and decoded no matter if it is a base
layer or an enhancement layer. The reason lies in the fact that a scalable video decoder decodes only the
requested layer and not the subsequent lower layers because this layer is not predicted from lower layers.
So PRNG on encoder and decoder side will be out of synchronization and no layer can be decrypted and
decoded. Thus if interlayer prediction is oﬀ, it is mandatory to use independent PRNG for each layers. In
case interlayer prediction is on or adaptive, we can decrypt and decode only the highest resolution and not
any lower layer. So even in this case, for playback of lower resolutions, it is mandatory to have separate
PRNG for each layer.
Let us have a scalable bitstream containing three resolutions to be protected. On the encoder side, let
us use three separate keys K1, K2 and K3 to encode 1st, 2nd, and 3rd layers respectively shown in Fig. 2.
On the decoder side, if we want to decode any of the higher resolutions, we need the keys for that en-
hancement layer and all the lower layers sothat we can decode each layer properly. To avoid the need of
multiple keys for higher resolutions, let us have three composite keys Kc1, Kc2, Kc3, each for 1st, 2nd and
3rd resolution respectively. Then we need to build a function which can extract the layer key K1 from all
the three composite keys Kc1, Kc2 and Kc3; key K2 from keys Kc2 and Kc3 and K3 from Kc3 as shown in Fig. 3.
A ﬁrst approach to solve this problem consists of concatenating the keys together. For example, for
decryption of 2nd resolution, we can concatenate K1&K2. But it makes the size of keys diﬀerent for every
resolution which is not a desirable feature. To have the keys of equal length for each resolution, we concate-
nate zeros to keys of lower layers and then encrypt them using AES algorithm in CFB mode. In that case,
AES will replace the zeros with non-zero values and as a result we get composite keys for every resolution
as shown in Fig. 4.
For a scalable bitstream containing three layers, with the key length of 64 bits for each layer. To generate
the KC3, we will concatenate all the three keys, thus making the length of composite key Kc3 equals to 192.
For generation of Kc2, we will put zeros in place of K3 and will encrypt it with AES to get Kc2 of 192
bits. Similarly for Kc1, we will replace both K2 and K3 with zeros and will encrypt it using AES.On the
decoder side, when Kc1 will be decoded by AES. It will output K1 only. Similarly Kc2 and Kc3 will output
respectively two and three keys for decoding of 2nd and 3rd resolutions.
For the encryption process, let the layer keys K1, K2 and K3 are of 64 bits each and Kc1, Kc2, Kc3 are of
192 bits. Fore encryption, we have used AES in CFB mode. In CFB mode, AES is a stream cipher.
In this mode, the previous encrypted block Yi−1 is used as the input of the AES algorithm in order to
create keystream Zi. Then, the current plaintext Xi is XORed with Zi in order to generate the encrypted text
Yi.
For the 1st iteration, Y0 is substituted by an initialization vector (IV). IV is created using the secret key
Km as the seed of the PRNG. Km is divided into 8 bits sequences. The PRNG produces a random number
for each byte component of the key. Then, we use IV as Y0. Zi and Yi are created as:
{
Zi = Ek(Yi−1), f or i ≥ 1
Yi = Xi ⊕ Zi , (1)
243 Ala Abu-Zahra et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  10 ( 2012 )  240 – 246 
As illustrated in Fig. 5, with the CFBmode of the AES algorithm, the generation of the keystream Zi depends
on the previous encrypted block Yi−1. Consequently, if two plaintexts are identical Xi = Xj in the CFB mode,
then always the two corresponding encrypted blocks are diﬀerent, Yi  Yj. So using the stream cipher, we
encrypt keys in a series. In this case, every encrypted key is used for the encryption of the subsequent key.
Fig. 2. Architecture for independent encryption of each layer in scalable video coding.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3. Extraction of layer keys K1, K2 and K3 from the composite keys: (a) Kc1, (b) Kc2, (c) Kc3.
Fig. 4. Creation of composite keys Kc1, Kc2 and Kc3 from layer keys K1, K2 and K3.
Fig. 5. AES encryption of layer keys in CFB mode.
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4. Experimental Results
Let us have a scalable bitstream containing three independently protected layers having resolutions of
QCIF, CIF and 4CIF with composite keys Kc1, Kc2 and Kc3. For simulation, we have tested both oﬀ-line and
on-line scenarios as explained in the following:
4.1. Oﬀ-line simulation
In ﬁrst scenario, we have a scalable protected bitstream on the computer and want to playback it oﬀ-
line. When the speciﬁc composite key is given, the decoder decrypts the composite key and hence, gets
the layer keys. The user just gets the part of the bitstream to which he is authorized. In this application,
bitstream extractor functionality is embedded in the read bitstreammodule of decoder, thus it only provides
the packets of those layers to the core decoding process which are to be decoded. Layer keys are used to
initialize the PRNGs of respective layers and proper decryption of authorized resolution is performed.
4.2. On-line scenario scenario.
In client server application, the scalable bitstream is on the server, and the client sends the request to
the server for playback of a certain video alongwith composite key. The bitstream extractor is the server
application in this scenario and it extracts the layer keys. From the key information, it will send the packets
of respective layers. On the client side, the decoder extract the layer keys and initialize the PRNGs with the
keys. In this case, the client has no knowledge about the details of the SVC bitstream i-e how many layer it
contains. The user just gets the part of the bitstream to which he is authorized, thus saving the bandwidth.
Fig. 6 shows the decoding of a city frame when using Kc1, Kc2 and Kc3 keys. One can note that there is a
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6. PSNR (dB) of {Y, U, V} of 1st frame of 4CIF resolution decoded with key: (a) Kc1 {22.2, 40.0, 42.5}, (b) Kc2 {24.2, 41.8, 44.7},
(c) Kc3 {44.2, 47.6, 49.0}.
considerable degradation in the quality of the image when the enhancement layers are not decoded with the
valid keys. This degradation will force the user to see the scaled-up version of the lower layer video which
is authorized.
In our analysis, 100 frames of benchmark video sequences were encoded as intra in a scalable bitstream
containing QCIF, CIF and 4CIF resolutions. Then the 4CIF resolution was decoded with composite keys
Kc1, Kc2 and Kc3 as shown in Table 1 for all the benchmark video sequences at quantization parameter (QP)
value of 18. Same analysis was performed for city in Table 2 over whole range of QP values. One can note
that PSNR with the respective composite key is a lot more better than with composite keys of other layers.
In another experiment, we have analyzed whether decoding the lower layer with respective composite key
and its scaled-up to 4CIF resolution is better than decoding the 4CIF resolution with composite key of lower
layers. In Table 3, the comparison has been performed for Kc1 for all the sequences and the same experiment
was performed for city for diﬀerent QP values in Table 4. The result shows that scaled-up 4CIF resolution
has better quality than decoded with Kc1. The diﬀerence between scaled-up and decrypted versions also
reduces as the QP value goes high. The results are also conﬁrmed by same experiment for Kc2 in Table 5
and Table 6.
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Table 1. PSNR for decoded 4CIF with diﬀerent compsite keys for benchmark video sequences at QP value of 18 for intra
frames.
Seq. PSNR (Y) (dB) PSNR (U) (dB) PSNR (V) (dB)
Kc1 Kc2 Kc3 Kc1 Kc2 Kc3 Kc1 Kc2 Kc3
city 22.7 24.9 44.2 40.2 42.1 47.7 42.6 44.7 48.9
crew 28.4 31.3 44.9 39.2 41.4 46.5 37.8 41.4 47.7
harbour 21.1 25.1 44.3 39.8 42.2 47.4 41.6 44.2 48.7
ice 28.4 31.1 46.1 42.5 45.4 51.0 38.5 42.4 51.6
soccer 25.1 27.5 44.8 40.0 42.1 47.6 42.1 44.4 49.1
Table 2. PSNR for decoded 4CIF with diﬀerent compsite keys for city at diﬀerent QP values for intra frames.
QP PSNR (Y) (dB) PSNR (U) (dB) PSNR (V) (dB)
Kc1 Kc2 Kc3 Kc1 Kc2 Kc3 Kc1 Kc2 Kc3
12 22.5 24.8 49.4 41.0 42.6 51.1 43.9 46.1 51.9
18 22.7 24.9 44.2 40.2 42.1 47.7 42.6 44.7 48.9
24 23.2 25.2 39.4 39.1 40.7 44.4 41.4 43.2 46.1
30 23.5 25.5 35.0 37.7 39.3 42.2 40.1 41.9 44.3
36 22.6 24.7 30.9 36.5 37.9 40.1 38.3 40.1 42.2
42 21.1 22.9 27.1 35.4 37.1 39.0 37.3 38.7 40.4
Table 3. Comparison of scaled QCIF and decrypted 4CIF with Kc1 of diﬀerent resolutions for benchmark video sequences
at QP value of 18 for intra frames.
Seq. PSNR (Y) (dB) PSNR (U) (dB) PSNR (V) (dB)
scaled encrypted scaled encrypted scaled encrypted
city 24.7 22.7 40.9 40.2 43.8 42.6
crew 30.1 28.4 40.0 39.2 37.9 37.8
harbour 23.1 21.1 40.6 39.8 42.5 41.6
ice 30.7 28.4 43.1 42.5 39.7 38.5
soccer 27.3 25.1 40.3 40.0 43.0 42.1
Table 4. Comparison of scaled QCIF and decrypted 4CIF with Kc1 for city at diﬀerent QP values for intra frames.
QP PSNR (Y) (dB) PSNR (U) (dB) PSNR (V) (dB)
scaled encrypted scaled encrypted scaled encrypted
12 24.8 22.5 41.6 41.0 44.9 43.9
18 24.7 22.7 40.9 40.2 43.8 42.6
24 24.6 23.2 39.7 39.1 42.4 41.4
30 24.2 23.5 38.8 37.7 41.2 40.1
36 23.5 22.6 37.9 36.5 39.8 38.3
42 22.4 21.1 37.1 35.4 38.7 37.3
Table 5. Comparison of scaled CIF and decrypted 4CIF with Kc2 of diﬀerent resolutions for benchmark video sequences
at QP value of 18 for intra frames.
Seq. PSNR (Y) (dB) PSNR (U) (dB) PSNR (V) (dB)
scaled encrypted scaled encrypted scaled encrypted
city 27.0 24.9 42.5 42.1 45.6 44.7
crew 33.2 31.3 42.6 41.4 42.1 41.4
harbour 27.2 25.1 43.1 42.2 45.3 44.2
ice 33.5 31.1 46.4 45.4 44.0 42.4
soccer 29.7 27.5 42.9 42.1 45.5 44.4
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Table 6. Comparison of scaled CIF and decrypted 4CIF with Kc2 for city at diﬀerent QP values for intra frames.
QP PSNR (Y) (dB) PSNR (U) (dB) PSNR (V) (dB)
scaled encrypted scaled encrypted scaled encrypted
12 27.0 24.8 43.3 42.6 47.0 46.1
18 27.0 24.9 42.5 42.1 45.6 44.7
24 26.8 25.2 41.1 40.7 43.9 43.2
30 26.3 25.5 40.0 39.3 42.7 41.9
36 25.4 24.7 38.9 37.9 41.0 40.1
42 23.8 22.9 38.1 37.1 39.6 38.7
5. Conclusion
A novel framework for independent access of diﬀerent resolutions in SVC based on CAVLC and CABAC
has been presented. The proposed scheme is quite eﬃcient for local playback and in streaming environment
on heterogeneous network in terms of bandwidth and processing power. The proposed scheme works ﬁne
whether we use interlayer prediction or not. Owing to no escalation in bit rate, our encryption scheme
is suitable for heterogeneous multimedia streaming scenarios in real-time environment. The experiments
have shown that we can achieve the protection of each resolution independently while providing the same
composite keys of same length for diﬀerent resolution. It has been shown that scaled up version has better
PSNR than decoded version with composite key of lower layers. The proposed scheme can be successfully
extended for temporal and quality scalability.
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